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SUMITRO!S ROLE IN FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
Robert Rice*
In June 1968, Dr* Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, probably Indo­
nesia’s most prominent economist, accepted the position of 
Minister of Trade for the Republic. Sumitro, in his past writ­
ings, has developed a number of ideas on the role of government 
in economic development in general, and using foreign trade as 
an instrument of economic policy in particular. Thus it seems 
particularly relevant at this time to survey his actions over 
the past fourteen months in the foreign trade sector in relation 
to his previously-expressed views.* 1
SumitroTs concepts about foreign trade policy and the use 
of government resources to foster economic development must be 
understood in the general framework of his criticisms of the 
comparative cost theory of international trade. He believes the 
theory is open to serious doubt from the standpoint of the 
underdeveloped nations because it is static; whereas economic 
development is a dynamic process.2 The theory assumes that the 
international division of labor together with the proportions of 
the factors of production that now exist are the most efficient 
and the most beneficial. But experience has shown that, with
* The author wishes to express his thanks to Malcolm Churchill, 
Gordon Donald and David Penny for their useful comments about 
an earlier draft of this article. The views expressed in the 
article and any shortcomings it may have, however, are the 
responsibility of the author himself.
1. Sumitrofs major theoretical work on economic development and
foreign trade is contained in his Ekonomi Pembangunan (Dja­
karta: P. T. Pembangunan, 1959). A collection of various 
speeches and short articles has been published as Persoalan 
Ekonomi di Indonesia (Djakarta: Indira, 1953). Sumitro has 
written numerous articles, among which the more noteworthy 
are: "Fiscal Policy, Foreign Exchange Control and Economic
Development," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, VII/4 (April 
1954); "Macro-Economics and Public Policy m  Economically 
Underdeveloped Areas," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, VI/4 
(April 1953); "Stabilization Policies in 1955,h Ekonomi dan 
Keuangan Indonesia, IX/1 (January 1956).
2. The following critique of the classical comparative cost 
theory is found in SumitroTs Ekonomi Pembangunan, esp. pp. 
308-10 and 344-48.
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industrialization, the balance of production costs and the 
factors of production alter markedly over time, and, therefore, 
the conditions surrounding present comparative costs will not 
necessarily apply in the future.
Underdeveloped countries should not necessarily specialize 
in the production of goods and services in which they presently 
have a comparative advantage in international trade. To do this 
would tend to maintain the discrepancies now existing between 
the levels of world income and in the allocation of the factors 
of production. The theory of comparative costs does not account 
for the differences which exist between the levels of technology, 
production, and development from one continent to another. These 
differences are caused by structural factors, and if they are 
permitted to continue, they will aggravate the situation that 
is already ruining the underdeveloped countries. Given the 
present international allocation of resources and the current 
state of technology, a free flow of trade may maximize total 
output and benefit the world as a whole, but Sumitro does ". . .
not agree with the implication that it would result in propor­
tionately increased benefits for the underdeveloped countries 
which have low income and low productivity.”
Sumitro cites four additional important weaknesses in the 
comparative cost theory of international trade. First, interna­
tional trade is not carried out under conditions of perfect 
competition, as is assumed by the theory; rather, it is strongly 
influenced by monopolistic elements in the industrialized coun­
tries to the detriment of the underdeveloped countries. Recog­
nizing that the direction of production, investment and economic 
life in the underdeveloped countries is regulated by such in­
terests, Sumitro was particularly concerned about foreign eco­
nomic power in Indonesia in the 1950fs, before the nationaliza­
tion of Dutch firms, since foreign enterprises exercised so much 
control over her economic affairs.
Second, the classical theory does not explain the chronic 
tendency for the prices of raw materials to decrease relative 
to the prices for industrial goods; this, along with the severe 
short-term price fluctuations of raw materials, can not only 
hinder development efforts of underdeveloped countries but ruin 
their economies as well. (The argument that the prices of raw 
materials tend to decrease relative to the prices of industrial 
goods was more commonly accepted among economists during the 
1950Ts than it is now.)
Third, the classical theory does not take into account the 
fact that because productivity in primary production is lower 
and increases more slowly than in industrial production, coun­
tries specializing in raw materials are basically in a weaker 
position than industrial countries when facing problems of 
foreign trade. Fourth, the benefits from productivity increases 
in the industrial countries will not necessarily be passed on
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to the underdeveloped countries, as is posited by the classical 
theory, but may rather primarily benefit the industrial countries 
themselves.
In an effort to counteract these tendencies of international 
trade which handicap the underdeveloped countries, Sumitro be­
lieves the government must thus take an active role through its 
import and export policies to improve the position of Indonesia1s 
products in the world market and actively promote production at 
home, including protection for "infant" though not ?Tsub-marginalIT 
industries. Because of structural weaknesses in the economy 
(such as in the allocation of resources and in factor endow­
ments), the government must sometimes intervene directly in the 
production and processing of the goods destined for the world 
market. The government must conserve the nationfs valuable 
foreign exchange for economic development by encouraging home 
industries to supply the products desired in the domestic market. 
To assure a continued growth, trade policies should be employed 
in such a way that inflation at home can be curbed and a more 
equitable distribution of profits be achieved.
Export Policy
Though during the past fourteen months, Sumitro has had, 
as Minister of Trade, some opportunity to try to put into effect 
his ideas about economic development, it is important to remem­
ber that he does not control any agency which can ensure that 
his regulations are strictly enforced. Moreover, as only one 
of several ministers concerned with economic affairs and as a 
new member of a team which has been planning the economic stabil­
ization program over the past two years, his powers, even in the 
field of trade, have been quite limited. In their own ways, the 
Ministers of Finance, Industry, Communications and Agriculture, 
the Chairman of the National Planning Agency and the Director 
of the Central Bank exert considerable influence in Indonesia1s 
international trade.
In the first place, all Ministers concerned with economic 
affairs are grouped together under the authority of the Minister 
of State in Charge of Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs 
(Mentevi EKUIN), the Sultan of Jogjakarta Hamengku Buwono IX. 
Second, before formulating a particular trade policy, the Minis­
ter of Trade must discuss it with the other ministers and high 
government officials to ensure that their respective policies 
do not conflict. The Minister of Finance,3 for example, is
3. The Minister of Finance, Dr. Ali Wardhana, is a former student 
of Sumitro and, like Sumitro, has spent several years as a 
professor in the Department of Economics of the University 
of Indonesia.
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responsible for setting import duty rates and the exchange rates 
at which import duties are calculated. The Central Bank deter­
mines policies for granting credit to importers in accordance 
with government priorities.
In tfie schema for operational control of the Five Year Plan 
(Repelita), the Minister of Trade heads the committees of foreign 
trade and essential goods. The responsibilities.of these com­
mittees include expanding exports in order to increase foreign 
exchange earnings; arranging for the importation of essential 
consumer goods, raw materials and other inputs for increasing 
domestic production; and ensuring the availability and overseeing 
the distribution of essential commodities.
As Minister of Trade, Sumitro has employed various policy 
tools to regulate import and export trade. He has stipulated 
the conditions that firms must satisfy in order to participate 
in trade, e.g., re-registration for renewal of licenses and pay­
ment of financial guarantees to the Ministry of Trade and fees 
for services provided by the Ministry. He has also been able 
to exercise direct control by granting monopolies to specific 
enterprises, or groups of enterprises, for the export and import 
of certain goods. He has restricted the areas in which foreign 
investment can be made in the trading sector to supermarkets, 
department stores and motor vehicle sole agencies.
In the export field, the Minister of Trade can directly 
affect the rupiah prices paid to exporters by determining the 
export category particular commodities are in, the percentage 
of foreign exchange paid to the exporters for each category, and 
by setting the check prices on various export goods.4 * By con­
4. There are two principal types of foreign exchange in Indone­
sia, Bonus Expor (B.E.) and Devisa Pelengkap (D.P.), or Com­
plementary Foreign Exchange. The principal sources of supply 
for B.E. are export earnings and credits from donor countries. 
For D.P., they are export earnings and private transfers from 
abroad. D.P. can be used to import all but prohibited goods; 
B.E. can be used only for goods on the B.E. List. The rates 
are determined by supply and demand, with some intervention 
by the government; the D.P. exchange rate is always higher 
than the B.E. rate.
The check price is the price in foreign exchange of a 
particular export commodity at which the exporter must surren­
der the foreign exchange earned to the Central Bank and is 
paid in rupiah for 85% or 90% of the foreign exchange at the 
B.E. rate, depending on whether the commodity is in the "A" 
or "B" group. If he can sell the commodity at a foreign ex­
change price higher than the check price, as is almost always 
the case, he can sell 100% of the foreign exchange earned 
from the difference between the actual selling price and the 
check price at the higher D.P. rate. The overprice is the 
difference between the actual selling price and the check 
price.
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tinuing to use the system of separate B.E. and D.P. rates with 
check prices for the group "A" and some group "B" exports, Sumitro 
can increase or decrease the incentive to export a particular 
good as opposed to others by changing their check prices. If 
the world market price of a commodity remains unchanged, an in­
crease in 'the check price will decrease the rupiah price paid 
to the exporter because a higher proportion of the foreign ex­
change earned must be surrendered to the Central Bank at the' 
lower B.E. rate and he is paid for only 85% or 90% of the B.E. 
surrendered. On the other hand, if the check price is decreased, 
the exporter receives more rupiahs because he can sell a higher 
proportion of the foreign exchange at the higher D.P. rate.
If the world market price of a particular export commodity 
is increasing, assuming the B.E. and D.P. rates remain constant, 
but the check price increases at a slower rate than the world 
market price, then the rupiah price paid to the exporter will 
increase faster than the world market price because he can sell 
a higher proportion of foreign exchange at the higher D.P. rate. 
If the check price is kept constant, an increase in the world 
market price will result in a more than proportionate increase 
in the rupiah export price paid;but if the world market price 
is decreasing, it also will result in a more than proportionate 
decrease in the rupiah price paid, thus in both cases making the 
fluctuation in rupiah earnings of the exporter greater than the 
fluctuation in the world market price.
In line, with the goals of the Five Year Plan, Sumitro and 
the Minister of Trade before him have tried to increase export 
earnings by increasing the total volume of exports and by in­
creasing the average foreign exchange price paid for them. To 
increase the volume, Sumitro has worked to increase both the 
proportion of total production that is exported and the total 
amount produced. Other objectives include eliminating smuggling, 
improving the position of those Indonesian export products that 
are "weak" in world markets, and increasing the proportion of 
exports going directly to the consuming countries.
In January, Sumitro announced: "The efforts in 1969 will
be directed especially towards increasing the value of trade, 
among others increasing the value added of export materials by 
upgrading or using new techniques such as manufacturing crumb 
rubber." But no radical changes in the trade pattern itself 
were planned.5
On June 20, 1968, Sumitro stated that he planned to give a 
greater incentive to exporters.6 On September 19, 1968, the 
percentage of foreign exchange paid to the exporters of Category
5. Business News, January 3, 1969.
6. Sinar Harapan, June 21, 1968.
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A export commodities (those in which Indonesia is "strong" in 
world markets and which make up approximately 80% of the volume 
of non-petroleum exports) was increased from 75% to 85%.7 In 
effect, these exporters now give the government somewhat less 
than 15% of the foreign exchange they earn; before, it had been 
under 25%, the exact percentage depending on the relation of 
the check price for the commodity to the price that they could 
command in the world market. This increased the relative incen­
tive given to export Category A commodities as compared with 
Category B commodities (those in which Indonesia is "weak" in 
world markets). This was in effect a decrease in export taxes, 
but was still consistent with Sumitro!s views since the prices 
of most of these export products were in a slump and he believes 
that the export taxes will only bring a large yield when there 
is an export boom. The government also hopes to increase the 
level of exports by giving credit to exporters and to traders 
collecting export commodities.
In promoting exports, Sumitro faces different problems for 
different export products--for example, international marketing 
in the case of coffee; declining exports in the case of copra; 
and declining quality in the case of rubber.
Coffee
Because the total production of coffee in Indonesia in 
1968 exceeded the coffee quota allocated to Indonesia by the 
International Coffee Organization, Sumitro took measures to in­
crease the quantity of exports to non-quota countries. On 
October 14-, 196 8 , he announced that any exporter selling coffee 
to a non-quota country would receive a 100% incentive in ICO 
coffee stamps from the government, permitting him to export the 
same quantity to a quota country. The relatively low price 
received from the non-quota country would thus be partly offset 
by the higher price gained from sales to the quota country.
This system would operate from October 1, 1968, to September 30, 
1969. Coffee producers and exporters complained, but SumitroTs 
main concern probably was the difficulty of preventing non-bona- 
fide exporters from exporting coffee to agents in non-quota 
countries who would in turn re-export it to the quota countries, 
a violation of the International Coffee Agreement.9
In the event, however, it is clear that an insufficient 
effort was made to increase exports to the non-quota countries,
7. Business News, September 23, 1968. 8
8. Sinar Harapan, October 15, 1968.
9. Business News, February 24-, 19 69 .
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and the quality of coffee exported was low. Accordingly, on 
January 2, 1969, Sumitro announced that in 1969, a sales combine 
would be established under the guidance of the Ministry of Trade 
to market surplus coffee to non-quota countries and to improve 
the quality of coffee exports.10 In April 1969, the Ministry 
of Trade reported that four coffee export syndicates would be 
set up, one for each of the main producer areas, which together 
produce about 85% of the coffee in Indonesia.11 The syndicates, 
co-ordinated with each other and with related offices by an 
official from the Ministry of Trade, were to comprise both pri­
vate and government companies; each would have a chairman ap­
pointed by the Ministry of Trade. Sumitro appointed the co­
ordinator on June 4, 1969, by which time many firms had already 
joined.12
The avowed goals of the syndicates now include:
External:
a. Carry out joint policy in determining and develop­
ing quality, determining the selling price and the 
terms of closing sales and export contracts.
b. Carry out joint policy in the effort to expand 
markets to both quota and non-quota countries.
c. Carry out joint policy in allotting the market 
regions.
Internal:
a. Make joint policy in determination and development 
of quality and the purchasing of coffee.
b. Make joint efforts to solve the problem of capital 
and transportation costs, and collection in relation 
to the problem of marketing.
c. Other joint efforts closely related to the problem 
of marketing and the improvement of quality.13
In order to guarantee an appropriate income for the coffee farm­
ers , the government will set the buying price for each area in
10. Ibid.., January 3 , 1969 .
11. Indonesian Economic Information Foundation, Indonesian 
Economic Bulletin (Amsterdam), June 20, 1969.
12. WARTA C.A.F.I., June 13, 1969.
13. Business News, April 4, 1969.
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which a syndicate operates.1 h Those exporters and entrepreneurs 
who do not join syndicates may not export or engage in inter- 
insular trade from and within the region in which the coffee 
syndicates operate.15
Formerly, many exporters not specializing in coffee could 
export it, but, under the new system of syndicates, prospective 
members must first be screened to determine if they are bonafide 
coffee exporters. For example, other exporters with investments 
in coffee processing facilities may not join the syndicates.16 
It is likely that once they are accepted, exporters will be re­
luctant to break the coffee export regulations because they 
would risk loss of membership. Every export transaction will 
be handled through the coffee syndicates and the government will 
supervise the operations of the individual members.17
It is particularly significant that the coordinator for 
the coffee export syndicates is not a private member of the syn­
dicates but is from the Ministry of Trade and that the chairmen 
are also appointed by the Ministry. In addition, the Ministry 
of Trade, by setting the prices paid to .the coffee producers and 
also the export check price, can regulate the level of profits 
to exporters, wholesalers and producers. By setting different 
prices for various grades of coffee, the Ministry of Trade can 
encourage the production and processing of the higher grades.
In the past, it has always proven difficult to enforce price 
regulations, particularly at the local level, and it remains to 
be seen how Sumitro is going to ensure that the purchase price 
set by the Ministry of Trade is indeed the price paid. The suc­
cess of the coffee syndicates will depend largely on the admin­
istrative discipline and efficiency in both the syndicates and 
the Ministry of Trade offices connected with them. It is still 
too early to see what effect the syndicates will have on the 
level of Indonesian coffee exports, particularly to the non­
quota countries.
Probably, many of the smaller exporters will be unable to 
fulfill the stiff requirements for full membership and will be 
forced to become sub-members. As sub-members, they must export 
with the letter of credit from the foreign importer opened up 
in favor of the full member with whom they are associated. This 
system can be detrimental to them--their trade secrets will be­
come known to a full member, and they will probably be charged 
for the full member’ s services, thus increasing their export
14. Ibid.
15. Sinar Harapan, April 5, 1969
16. Business News, June 13, 1969
17. Ibid., June 6, 1969, pp. 12-13.
191
costs. Eventually, the full members might even take away cus­
tomers from the small exporters by establishing good relations 
with their customers and underpricing them.18
Copra
Copra differs from coffee. Here the problem is not so much 
one of marketing internationally what is already being produced, 
but of raising production, increasing the proportion of coconut 
production processed into copra and decreasing smuggling. Copra 
production provides a livelihood for several million people in the 
Celebes and the Moluccas, but from 1952 to 1967, Indonesian 
copra exports have decreased from 346,100 to 112,100 metric 
tons. It has been estimated that, in six to ten years, Indonesia 
will be forced to import copra.19
In an attempt to reverse this trend, the government decided 
to establish an independent agency called the Sole Agency for 
Copra Affairs (Badan Tunggal Urusan Kopva) responsible to the 
Ministry of Trade but having its own boards of directors and 
supervisors and operating according to business norms.20 The 
directors in the main office will be appointed and dismissed by 
the President, upon the suggestion of the Minister of Trade; 
heads of the provincial offices by the Minister of Trade; and 
the heads of the regency Ckabupaten) offices by the provincial 
office heads. This agency resembles the Copra Foundation of the 
early 1950?s, when sale and export of copra was a government 
monopoly, and it is an example of the type of government agency 
advocated by Sumitro for commodities of strategic economic 
importance.
Scheduled to begin operation on August 1, 1969, the agency 
will act as the sole buyer and seller of copra in the Celebes 
and the Moluccas. It will determine allocations and targets for 
local consumption, interisland shipments and exports for each 
producing province, purchase and sale prices and other condi­
tions , and which companies and cooperatives will be permitted 
to trade copra on its behalf.21 Sumitro hopes the agency also 
can increase foreign exchange earnings by raising the price at 
which Indonesia can sell its copra in world markets. By giving 
the agency a monopoly on exports, he hopes that it will also
18. Ibid., June 11 , 1969, p. 9A ; June 16 , 1969 > p- 9 .
19 . Ibid., March 7, 1969.
20 . Sinar Harapan, May 9 , 1969 ; Business News, March 5
i—
1
0
4 Sinar Harapan, May 9 , 1969 ; Business News, May 19,
p . 9 .
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help combat smuggling which has historically been a serious 
problem in Indonesia.
Another important objective of the agency is to reduce the 
difference between the price the copra farmers receive and the 
rupiah export price. In early March 1969, this difference was 
reportedly more than 100% and a large portion was used at vari­
ous levels of the cooperative organizations for social or non­
economic ends. Sumitro intends to increase the price paid to 
the producers from the Rp. 16 per kilo (being paid in the first 
week of March 1969), to at least Rp. 20 per kilo, although it 
may vary from region to region depending on the cost of produc­
tion to the farmer. As well as increasing and stabilizing the 
price paid to the producers, he hopes to decrease the amount of 
mark-up going to non-economic elements. This, combined with a 
more rational system of granting credit, will then encourage 
more replanting and processing of coconuts into copra and a con­
sequent increase in production. Under the new scheme, all of 
the export overprice will be allotted to the producing areas; 
formerly, it went to the exporters. Money needed for develop­
mental efforts will thus be taken from the selling price rather 
than from the price paid to the producers.22
The copra agency represents an attempt to take control of 
the copra trade away from the powerful political elements which 
have influenced it in the past.23 24 Sumitro will almost certainly 
meet strong resistance even though he had previously discussed 
the plan with various groups in the copra regions during a trip 
there in February 1969. If the Sole Agency is to be successful, 
Sumitro must either cooperate with them without compromising the 
interests of the copra producers or prevent them from sabotaging 
his efforts. He might have had this in mind when he stated that 
the agency is willing to work together with existing cooperatives 
and private enterprises as long as the latter participate in a 
manner beneficial to copra management. If other exporters "are 
able to offer conditions with respect to price and other condi­
tions that are the same as those obtained by the Sole Agency 
for Copra Affairs in world markets, they will also be given an 
opportunity to play a role."2h He has already begun to make 
contracts with certain cooperatives and private enterprises to 
export copra on behalf of the Sole Agency and it appears that 
the agency will begin its operations on schedule.2^
22. Business News, March 5, 1969, pp. 15-16.
23. Ibid., March 7, 1969, pp. 2, 7.
24. Ibid., March 5, 1969, pp. 16-17.
25. Ibid., July 18, 1969, p. 5.
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Rubber
Even more than in the ease of coffee and copra, the Ministry 
of Trade has made a determined effort to improve the quality of 
smallholder rubber and to increase the proportion of exports 
going directly to consuming countries. On November 5, 1968, the 
Ministry reimposed the ban on exports of low grade rubber used 
by remilling factories and smokehouses and announced it was 
offering credit to entrepreneurs "who had been given the task 
of collecting smallholder rubber and purchasing it in the name 
of the government.Tf The government has strongly encouraged the 
setting up of crumb rubber factories and the modernization of 
rubber remilling factories and smokehouses, it has offered 
credit, permitted a few foreign enterprises to invest in crumb 
rubber factories and imported the equipment for twenty crumb 
rubber plants itself.26
The crumb rubber plants already holding permits have a 
planned capacity of approximately 483,100 metric tons per year,27 
which is almost three times as large as the average rubber ex­
ports to Singapore from 1960 to 1962.28 When the planned and' 
existing plants are operating at full capacity, Indonesia will 
have almost eliminated its dependence on Singapore for rubber 
processing and increased the proportion of rubber exports going 
direct to consuming countries. Because of* the large number of 
applications to set up crumb rubber factories, the government 
announced on July 15, 1969, that for the time being, it was not 
accepting new applications, except in certain specific cases.29
Soon after coming into office, Sumitro stabilized rubber 
check prices by making them subject to review monthly instead 
of weekly and also by tending to leave a price unchanged for 
several months. He has increased the rupiah export price paid, 
first decreasing by approximately 7% the check prices of the 
various types of rubber in July 1968, and then, during the next 
fourteen months, increasing the check prices of the various 
types of rubber at a slower rate than the world market prices 
increased. This caused a decrease in the de facto export tax 
in foreign exchange paid by exporters. As a result, rubber ex­
porters received a windfall profit, something which Sumitro 
opposed in principle. But, evidently, he hoped to encourage 
increased rubber exports. The increase in rupiahs paid to
26. Ibid., November 6, 1968; Indonesian Economic Bulletin, June
27, 1969.
27. Indonesian Economic Bulletin, August 1, 1969.
28. Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia, 1964-1967 (Djakarta: 
Biro Pusat Statistik, 1967), p. 227.
29. Business News, July 16, 1969, p. 11A.
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exporters was greater than that caused by the decrease in foreign 
exchange paid to the government because the percentage of foreign 
exchange that they could sell at the higher D.P. rate increased, 
particularly in the period March to September 1969. (See Table 1.)
In July 1968, Sumitro changed the check prices in order to 
encourage export of rubber blankets, produced by remilling fac­
tories, rather than exporting sheets. Yet, in January 1969, he 
increased their check prices while leaving the check prices of 
sheets unchanged, thus making the percentage of overprice paid 
for blankets approximately the same as for sheets. (Table 1)
It is likely that the increased incentive to export blankets was 
given in July 1968 because he wanted to give an additional in­
centive to remillers to modernize and rehabilitate their remill­
ing factories, but by January 1969, because of the continuing 
rise in world rubber prices, he felt that this special incentive 
was no longer necessary.
On May 1, 1969, the Minister of Trade increased the check 
prices of the lower grades of rubber produced by remilling fac­
tories while the check prices of the higher grades remained un­
changed, resulting in a decrease in the overprices of lower 
grades relative to the higher grades. This is an effort to in­
crease the incentive,directly to the remilling factories and 
indirectly to the small holders,to produce a higher proportion 
of the higher grades.30
Considering the importance of Singapore as a processing and 
collection center for smallholder rubber from several Indonesian 
provinces, banning exports of low-quality rubber was a drastic 
measure and, at least in the short run, it resulted in large 
losses to these regions. The Governor of Djambi, for example, 
was so concerned about the adverse effect that he lifted the 
ban, only reversing his decision after meeting with Sumitro in 
Djakarta.31 32 In April 1969, Sumitro did permit Bengkulu to ex­
port as much as 5,000 metric tons of slabs at one time, provided 
100% of the profits were used in the rehabilitation of the pro­
vince . 3 2
By banning all exports of low-quality rubber used by re­
milling factories and smokehouses, Sumitro hoped to alleviate 
the fears of potential investors in crumb rubber and remilling 
factories that Singapore and Penang buyers would create short­
ages of the low quality rubber they need. He has tried to con­
vince them that the ban will not be lifted.
30. Ibid., May 2, 1969, p. 13; April 2, 1969, p. 3A.
31. Kompas, November 15, 1968, p. 2.
32. Ibid., May 1, 1969, p. 3.
Table 1
Rupiahs Received by Exporters per Pound of Rubber Exported
January,
1968
June, 
1968
July, 
1968
December, 
1968
January, 
1969
March, 
1969
May,
1969
July, 
1969 September, 1969
R.S.S.I.
New York price (U.S. $) 17.0 21.1 20.8 22.4 22.3 26.2 26.1 27.5 27.6
Price gaid to exporters3 15.3 19.4 19.1 20.7 20.6 24.5 24.4 2^.8 25.9
Check price 14.1 14.1 13.1 13.3 13.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 16.4Overprice 1.2 5.3 6.0 7.4 7.3 10.2 10.1 11.5 9.5
Percent of foreign exchange
sold as D.P. , 7.8 27.3 31.4 35.7 35.4 41.6 41.4 44.6 36.7
Rps. recTd from B.E. soldD 34.4 34.4 32.0 32.5 32.5 35.0 35.0 35.0 40.1
Rps. rec'd from B.E. soldc 34.4 34.4 32.0 36.9 36.9 39.6 39.6 39.6 45.4
Rps. recfd from selling the
overprice for D.P.d 4.6 20.1 22.8 28.1 27.7 38.8 38.4 43.7 36.1
Total rupiahs received^* 39.0 54.5 54.8 60.6 60.2 73.8 73.4 78.7 76.2
Total rupiahs received0 39.0 54.5 54.8 65 .0 64.6 78.4 78.0 83.3 81.5
No. 3 Thick Blanket Crepe6
New York price (U.S. £) 16.0 19.1 19.3 22.3 22.1 24.3 23.8
Price paid to exporters3 14.3 17.4 17.6 20.6 20.4 22.6 22.1
Check price 11.4 12.5 10.4 10.4 13.0 13.5 13.5
Overprice 2.9 4.9 7.2 10.2 7.4 9.1 8.6
Percent of foreign exchange
sold as D.P. 20.3 28.2 40.9 49.5 36.3 40.3 38.9
Rps. rec'd from B.E. sold*5 27.9 30.6 25.4 25.4 31.8 33.0 33.0
Rps. recfd from B.E. sold0 27.9 30.6 25.4 28.8 36.0 37.4 37.4
Rps. recTd from selling the
overprice for D.P.^ 11.0 18.6 27.4 38.8 28.1 34.6 32.7
Total rupiahs received^ 38.9 49.2 52.8 64.2 59.9 67.6 65.7
Total rupiahs received0 38.9 49.2 52.8 67.6 64.1 72.0 70.1
a. Obtained by subtracting freight charges from the New York price.
b. Assuming that 25% of the B.E. is given to the government for-all months.
c. Assuming that 25% of the B.E. is given to the government for January, June and July, 1968, and 15% for the other months.
d. For all months the B.E. and D.P. rates that have been used are Rp. 326/U.S.$ and Rp. 380/U.S.$ respectively, the average
rates for April, May and June, 1969.
e. In Indonesia known as Blanket C.
Sources: New York price January 1968 through May 1969: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, August 1969, U.N., p. 164, Table
59 (the prices are monthly averages); New York price July and September 1969 , an approximate figure based on prices 
from the Wall Street Journal; check prices: taken from various issues of Business News, for the beginning of eachmonth.
196
Probably for a variety of reasons, Sumitro has not made the 
same institutional changes in the marketing of smallholder rubber 
as for coffee and copra, also principally smallholder products. 
Rubber is not marketed under the terms of a world agreement as 
is coffee, and, therefore, no problem of surplus production 
exists. There is no cooperative organization having a monopoly 
to market rubber as there was for copra; it has traditionally 
been handled by the private sector and the mark-up going to the 
middlemen is probably generally lower in the case of rubber be­
cause of greater competition among the rubber buyers. Estab­
lishing a monopoly organization to market rubber would have been 
more difficult because there are more principal producing re­
gions spread over a larger geographic area and more variation 
in producing and marketing the various grades of rubber than 
copra. After gaining some experience with the Sole Agency for 
Copra Affairs and the various syndicates for marketing coffee, 
sugar and flour, however, the Ministry of Trade may still decide 
to set up a similar body for rubber, despite SumitroTs November 
5, 1968 statement denying such a plan.3*
There are four basic methods that the Ministry of Trade has 
used to increase the average foreign exchange selling price of 
Indonesian export products: improve the quality of Indonesian
products exported; encourage export directly to the consuming 
country rather than through a third country such as Singapore 
or Malaysia; restrict the number of companies that can export 
the product and encourage them to cooperate in marketing the 
product to obtain the highest price or grant a monopoly on ex­
port to a single agency; co-operate in marketing the product 
with other major producing countries. All of these methods have 
also been part of official export policy in the past.3  ^ What 
is new about SumitroTs approach is his zealous effort to set up 
new institutions to improve organization and supervision in the 
export sector and to attract investment to it.
The Ministry of Trade will undoubtedly take further steps 
designed to improve the quality of export products, but it is 
restricted because, in some cases, other Ministries have more 
authority. For example, the quality of plantation products is 
determined principally by the state and foreign plantation com­
panies who are under the Ministry of Agriculture; the quality 
of mineral products is controlled by the state mining companies 
under the Ministry of Mining. Sumitro1s power to promote Indo­
nesian non-mineral exports, however, has been increased with 
Presidential Instruction No. 7 of March 25, 1969.35 Although
33. Business News, November 6, 1968, p. 12.
3M-. For an official statement of government export policy in 
1967, see the Decree of the Minister of Trade No. 102/SK/ 
VIII/1967 as reprinted in: Business News, August 25, 1967.
35. Business News, July 7, 1969, p. 9A.
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current efforts to encourage exporting directly to the consuming 
countries have principally concerned smallholder rubber, Sumitro 
hopes that the Sole Agency for Copra Affairs will also be able 
to bypass Singapore and Hong Kong.36 In keeping with Sumitro1s 
November 5, 1968 announcement that the government still seeks 
to change Indonesia’s export pattern and sell directly to the 
consumer,37 measures will probably be taken to encourage the 
direct export of products such as pepper, cassia, nutmeg and 
wood products, a large proportion of which is now exported to 
Singapore and Penang.
The Five Year Plan calls for an active search to broaden 
the market for export products so that Indonesia is not dependent 
on one region. Presently, exports are biased towards Western 
Europe; in the future, they should be directed toward as many 
countries as possible, especially those of the Pacific basin 
such as Australia and Japan, and including Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union. Exports, however, must be based on comparative 
profits and should not be organized through marketing, trade or 
barter agreements, as was often the case during the Sukarno era.38
In connection with this desire for a broader marketing 
policy, on June 5, 1969, the Ministry of Trade changed its August 
1967 regulation concerning tobacco exports in order to allow 
greater freedom in marketing.39 All Deli, Vorstenland and 
Besuki Naoogst types of leaf tobacco for cigars must still be 
exported to one of three Indonesian firms in Bremen, West Germany 
— Perrin GmbH, Deutsch-Indonesisch Tabak Handels Gesellschaft, 
and Timindo GmbH--except with the special permission of the 
Ministry of Trade. Other types of tobacco, as before, can still 
be exported either to one of these three firms or to buyers in 
other countries, with the f.o.b. price40 determined by the Minis­
try of Trade. But under the new regulation, if these three firms 
want to sell these types of tobacco outside the Bremen auction, 
they no longer need prior approval from the Supervisory Agency 
of Tobacco Sales (Badan Pengawas Pendjualan Tembakau), an appara­
tus of the Ministry of Trade. Their operations are still over-
36. Already in 1952, Sumitro had advocated a policy of direct 
trade rather than going through transit ports; see, Persoalan 
Ekonomi, p. 248; Kompas, March 5 , 1969 .
37. Business News, November 11, 1968, p. 1.
38. Sinar Harapan, January 22, 1969, p. 5.
39. Business News, August 28, 1967, pp. 5A-7A; Sinar Harapan,
June 12, 1969, p. 2.
40. The initials f.o.b. refer to ’’free on board” and represent 
the foreign exchange price on board ship in the harbor from 
which the good is being exported.
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seen by the agency, but the three firms are supposed to sell the 
tobacco wherever is the best price. Probably most of the leaf 
tobacco will still be sold in the Bremen auction, but an effort 
will be made to sell leaf tobacco that is not representative 
outside of the auction.41 By continuing to restrict the number 
of tobacco sellers, Sumitro is limiting the number of Indonesian 
suppliers and thereby hopes to achieve a better price.
It is uncertain what steps the Ministry of Trade will take 
toward cooperation in production and price policy with other 
exporting countries, although such action is called for in the 
Five Year Plan. As early as 1951, Sumitro urged cooperation 
among producing countries through joint discussions before set­
tling contracts with consumer nations and by exchanging informa­
tion.42 In June 1969, Indonesia joined the Asian Coconut Com­
munity whose objective is to encourage the cooperation of member 
countries in research, marketing, improving production and deal­
ing with import restrictions such as the European Common Market. 
It does not appear to be aimed at restricting supply.43 Recently 
it was reported that Indonesia and India, presently the two main 
pepper producers, are planning to form a pact,but its exact pro­
visions are still unclear.44
Copra, coffee, pepper and tea are mainly smallholder com­
modities and a substantial proportion of the total production 
is consumed domestically. By changing trade policy, the per­
centage exported can be increased. On the other hand, it is 
more difficult for Sumitro to regulate exports of items pro­
duced by a relatively small number of firms, such as petroleum, 
plantation rubber, palm oil, tin, and bauxite. Except in the 
cases of petroleum and palm oil, a very high proportion of total 
production is exported and, therefore, the quantity of exports 
is directly related to production. It is the Ministries of 
Mining and Agriculture together with the state enterprises under 
their jurisdiction and a few foreign firms which determine 
directly the amounts of these latter products to be produced 
and exported.
Steps are being taken to diversify Indonesian exports, al­
though mainly to increase exports of additional primary products 
rather than manufactured products. The government has success­
fully attracted foreign investment in the petroleum, mining, 
fishing and forestry industries, which will probably result in 
a rapid increase in their respective exports during the next few
41. Kompas, June 7 , 1969 , pp. 1, 3.
42. Sumitro, Persoalan Ekonomi, pp. 194-95.
43. Business News, June 4, 1969, pp. 2A, 3A.
44. Ibid., July 16, 1969, p. 5.
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years and enlarge their importance relative to agricultural pro­
ducts. It will also expand the number of products exported in 
large quantities.
The Five Year Plan calls for both diversification in the 
composition of exports and a doubling in the value of Group B 
exports--the so-called weak commodities.1*5 The "B" sectors in 
which there is to be a large increase in exports are forestry, 
fishing, small and handicraft industries.1*6 So far, it seems 
that Sumitro has concentrated mainly on Group A commodities—  
coffee, copra, rubber, tobacco and pepper--rather than on Group 
B. For example, he raised the percentage of foreign exchange 
received by exporters of "A” commodities while the percentage 
received for !fBn commodities has remained unchanged.h 7
In accordance with authority granted by President Suharto,1*8 
on June 1, 1969, a check price was set on five kinds of wood, 
notably teak, in an effort to increase exports, decrease specu­
lation and ensure continuity of production. But it is doubtful 
whether such action will cause the expected increase, although 
it may result in an increased amount of Bonus Expor being paid 
to the government and less foreign exchange to the exporters.
It appears that Sumitro has done nothing so far to increase 
exports from small and cottage industry, although an important 
objective of his import policy is designed to increase the capa­
city of the industrial sector. It is likely that, in time, 
Sumitro will take measures to promote the export of both small 
and cottage industry products as well as those of other types 
of industries after existing industries are rehabilitated and 
new ones developed. He is personally committed to changing the 
composition of exports with an increasing emphasis on light in­
dustry products.
Import Policy
After taking office, Sumitro said that import policy should 
be designed to increase government revenues by raising import 
duties, to expand production by protecting domestic industries 
and assuring them a steady supply of needed materials, and to 
maintain the smooth supply of essential commodities. He also 
strongly advocated decreasing imports of consumer goods and 45678
45. Sinar Harapan, January 22, 1969, p. 5.
46. Business News, January 20, 1969, p. 3.
47. Ibid.., September 23 , 1968 .
48. Presidential Decision No. 408, 1969.
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increasing imports of raw materials and capital goods.49
In order to maintain a balance between needs of consumption 
and production, the government must closely watch developments 
in these two areas and check changing prices which reflect the 
changes in supply and demand. If unevenness in the flow of 
goods develops, the government has two "lines of defense" that, 
it can use: first, indirect measures using monetary, fiscal
and commercial policy, for example, changing surcharge or import 
duty rates accompanied by a loosening up of credit policy, and 
secohd, if these prove ineffective, direct steps, such as im­
porting the needed goods to keep supply and demand in balance.50 
In fact, Sumitro applied this second step in several instances 
in 1968 and 1969.
As Minister of Trade, Sumitro has regulated imports by 
banning imports of certain goods, changing the list of permitted 
imports using Bonus Expor foreign exchange, banning imports 
using regular (non-credit) B.E. from July 10 to July 31, 1968, 
changing the goods included in various import categories and 
making arrangements for importers to import certain goods on 
behalf of the Ministry of Trade. He has also specified certain 
conditions that importers must fulfill in the cases of motor 
vehicles and newsprint. So far, Sumitro has not set quantita­
tive quotas on imported goods, probably because it would be 
difficult to implement efficiently; also it would not yield the 
government the same revenue as an import duty, but would result 
in windfall profits to the importers. He favors having a cer­
tain amount of direction from market forces.51
The Ministers of Trade and Finance have taken joint action 
to require prepayment of import duties when a letter of credit 
is opened and also that importers using Devisa Pelengkap have 
an import license (not required formerly).52 On June 15, 1968, 
the two Ministers decided that prepayment of customs and excise 
duties would be required on commodities from Groups B and C be­
fore opening letters of credit, with the rupiahs paid to be 
transferred to the Central Bank daily in order to prevent credit 
expansion.53 This measure was intended both to decrease the
49. Sinar Harapan, May 29, 1968, p. 1; May 30, 1968, pp. 1, 2; 
Business News, July 17, 1968, p. 3; January 20, 1969, pp.
3, 4.
50. Business News, December 13, 1968, p. 19.
51. 0. G. Roeder, "Try, Try Again," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
No. 31 (July 28-August 3, 1968), p. 224.
52. Kompas, October 23, 1968, p. 1.
53. Business News, June 19, 1968, p. 6A.
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total demand for Bonus Expor foreign exchange and to make it 
less profitable to import "Bt! and "C" goods as opposed to "A" 
(very essential) goods.
On August 28, 1968, another joint decision exempted from 
the prepayment regulation those imports eligible for financing 
by credit B.E. from countries which grant credit to Indonesia, 
in order to encourage such imports.5h On January 17, 1969, in 
order to guarantee the flow of goods and also in preparation 
for the Five Year Plan, the Minister of Finance decided to post­
pone prepayment regulations on a long list of other items. 
Finally, approximately ten and one-half months after the original 
decision, on April 30, 1969, the Ministers of Trade and Finance 
nullified the entire prepayment regulation for Groups B and C 
goods.* 55 They apparently considered it more important to en­
courage the import of raw materials and capital goods than to 
reduce the demand for Bonus Expor, as, by April 19 69 , the Bonus 
Expor rate had become stabilized. The frequent changes in 
customs duty prepayment regulations also suggests that they were 
intended to attain a temporary policy objective.
Promoting Local Industry
Sumitro has increased the rate of protection for many pro­
ducts and decreased the demand for Bonus Expor relative to 
Devisa Pelengkap by requiring the use of the latter for import 
purposes. For example, on June 17, 1968, Sumitro removed all 
fine textiles, except velveteen, from the list of goods that 
could be imported using Bonus Expor, i.e., the B.E. list, but 
still permitted their import using Devisa Pelengkap.56 On 
April 3, 1969, he did the same for galvanized iron sheets and, 
on June 23, for Virginia leaf tobacco, except for PL-M-80 ship­
ments, and also moved paint raw materials from the less essen­
tial group C to Group B.57 58 On March 17, 1969, Sumitro decided 
that newsprint could only be imported using B.E. credit or grant 
foreign exchange, and only by importers designated by the Minis­
try of Trade.5
5*4. Ibid. , September 2 , 1968 , p. 9A.
55. Ibid., May 2, 1969, p. 1A.
56. Ibid., June 19, 1968, p. 7A.
57. Indonesian Economic Bulletin, July 18, 1969; Business News, 
April 7, 1969, p. 2A.
58. Kompas, April 17, 1969, p. 2. It appears that this regula­
tion is not being enforced; see, Business News, June 11,
1969 , p . 9 .
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During the first four months that he was Minister of Trade, 
Sumitro banned the importation of several categories of goods, 
although he later lifted the ban on two of them. On July 11, 
1968, he strengthened an earlier regulation banning the importa­
tion of cars with a f.o.b, value of over $2,000, requiring that 
those cars which had already arrived in Indonesian waters must 
be sent out of the country within thirty days.59 SumitroTs pre­
decessor had already banned imports of luxury cars, 21" or 
larger TV's, console radio-record players and cloth with batik 
motifs.60 On February 17, 1969, Sumitro lifted the ban on the 
first three items but placed a surtax of 100% on them.61
On August 3, 1968, Sumitro banned the importation of most 
books, magazines and other printed matter in Indonesian or re­
gional languages in order to protect the Indonesian publishing 
industry.62 On September 6, 1968, he temporarily banned the 
imports of certain sizes of bicycle and automobile tires because 
he thought sufficient amounts were being produced within the 
country.63 64 Because prices began increasing and domestic produc­
tion was insufficient to meet the local demand, on December 12 
imports were again permitted, but only using Devisa Pelengkap„6 *
It appears that Sumitro will not ban imports of luxury 
articles in the future just to prevent them from being imported 
but will use this method to protect and encourage new industries 
in certain areas. A high duty rate on luxury goods is, in 
his view, a more efficient means of restricting imports and it 
provides revenue for the government at the same time. Sumitro 
has stated that government policy will protect domestic produc­
tion by changing the customs duty rates on competing goods but 
it will also keep in mind the interests of consumers. He cau­
tioned that protection is not identical with high import duties 
or import bans because these, if excessive, may encourage smug­
gling which would further harm domestic industries.
Motor Vehicle Assembly
The Ministers of Trade, Industry and Communications together 
desire to encourage domestic assembly of motor vehicles through
59. Business News, January 17, 1969, p. 3.
60. Ibid., July 15, 1968, p. 4A; February 2, 1968, p. 10A.
61. Ibid., February 21, 1969, p. 9.
62. Ibid., August 5, 1968, p. 6A.
63. Ibid., September 11, 1968, p. 3.
64. Kompas, December 14, 1968, p. 2; Business News, December 16, 
IW8, p. 14A.
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joint ventures with foreign manufacturers. Beginning on July 1, 
1969 , commercial vehicles could only be imported into Java, and 
on August 1 into Sumatra, in a ’’completely knocked down” condi­
tion, except in certain isolated local areas where a special 
permit might be obtained.65 ’’Commercial vehicles” included 
jeeps, buses and trucks but excluded sedans, station wagons, 
specialized vehicles, forklifts and forklift trucks.66 On 
January 31, 1969, the Ministers of Trade and Industry had set 
the definition of a ”completely-knocked-down” condition for each 
kind of motor vehicle, effective July 9, to ensure that a great 
deal of actual assembly takes place in Indonesia.67 To be able 
to assemble the ”C-K-D” vehicles, an assembly enterprise would 
have to make a good deal of capital investment. Also on January 
31, the Ministers decided that one of the assembling firms would 
be located in Medan, one in Makassar, three in Djakarta and two 
in Surabaja.68
The Ministers of Trade and Industry had already specified 
that every motor vehicle company abroad that wishes to export 
vehicles to Indonesia must appoint, with the consent of the 
Ministry of Trade, one national enterprise as its sole agent; 
priority would be given to assembly enterprises that already 
had a permit from the Minister of Industry. On July 11, 1969, 
the Minister of Trade decided that under the terms of the 
Foreign Capital Investment Law, a foreign enterprise might 
become a sole agent if it was a joint venture with domestic 
capital, but the majority of shares must be owned by and the 
majority of board members must be Indonesian nationals.69 Assem 
bly must be carried out in one of seven companies designated by 
the Ministry of Industry.
On February 15, 1969, the Minister of Trade stipulated that 
to be considered as a sole agent of motor vehicles, a firm must 
have skilled technical personnel, must be appointed by or have 
a contract with a foreign motor vehicle producer as its sole 
agent, and must assemble vehicles at one of the enterprises 
designated by the Ministry of Industry.70 On April 1, 1969, the
65. Sinar Harapan, May 21, 1969, p. 5; Business News, April 11, 
1969 , p. 12A; April M-, 1969 , pp. 10A, 11A; Kompas, June 10, 
1969, p . 1.
66 . 
67 .
6 8 .
69 .
70.
Direktorat Djenderal Bea dan Tjukai, Tarip Bea Masuk, August 
1965, Seno n.v., pp. 252-53.
Indonesia Raya, July 19, 1969, p. 3; Business News, April 4, 
1969, pi 7A.
Business News, April 11, 1969, p. 13A.
Antara Daily News Bulletin (Bonn, West Germany), July 15,
T96"3"j p. 1.
Business News, April 4, 1969, pp. 10A, 11A.
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Minister of Industry designated five assembly enterprises, four 
private and one government--?. N . Gaja Motor, Indonesian Service 
Company, P.T. Indonesia Merdeka Motors, P.T. Inmermotors and 
P.T. Indatim--and, in July 1969, the Medan assembler, N.V. 
Nasional ^otor Corp., a private company.71
It is not clear what advantages derive from having the 
Minister of Industry appoint the seven assembly enterprises 
rather than permitting the Indonesian and foreign companies to 
work.out their own agreements, as has been the case in most 
other foreign investment projects. Perhaps the Ministers expect 
that by designating the enterprises and restricting their num­
ber, the bargaining power of Indonesian enterprises with respect 
to the foreign auto companies is strengthened. Questions have 
already been raised, however, whether correct procedure was fol­
lowed in selecting the first four firms and whether the right 
firms were selected.72
The strategy for developing a motor vehicle assembly indus­
try has been planned with an eye to the large potential market 
in Indonesia and the interest already shown by foreign auto­
makers, particularly Japanese, English and German.73 By the 
end of July, sole agency agreements with roughly half of the 
major car and truck producers had been or were about to be con­
cluded and approved by the Ministry of Trade.74 The government 
assumes it will be possible to attract foreign investment in the 
assembly industry despite the conditions that shares for joint 
ventures and board members must be more than 50% Indonesian and 
that the assembling enterprises must be willing to assemble dif­
ferent makes of vehicles.75 This strategy represents the first 
use of import bans to attract foreign investment to assemble a 
product domestically and one of the few cases where the majority 
of the shares must be owned by Indonesian citizens. If Sumitro 
is successful, then it can be expected that similar measures 
will be taken in other areas, such as assembling irrigation 
pumps, hullers and tractors. While banning imports of "non- 
C-K-D" commercial vehicles may cause an increased foreign ex­
change cost for the vehicles as well as a higher domestic rupiah
71. Ibid., April 11, 1969, p. 11A; Indonesian Economic Bulletin, 
July 4, 1969.
72. Sinar Harapan, April 9, 1969, p. 2.
73. Two Japanese automobile companies, Toyota and Nissan, are 
planning to export truck component parts for assembly in 
Djakarta and Surabaja. Sinar Harapan, June 23, 1969, p. 2.
74. Business News, July 28, 1969, p. 12.
75. Ibid., January 17, 1969, p. 3; Sinar Harapan, April 9,
p . 2 .
1969 ,
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price and a loss of revenue to the government, both in the past 
and recently Sumitro has advocated paying this price.76
Sumitro has stated explicitly that earlier regulations pro­
hibiting foreign enterprises from commercial import and export 
in Indonesia are still in effect. On July 15, 1968, he decided 
that foreign enterprises which have invested in Indonesia under 
the terms of the Foreign Capital Investment Law may import only 
the capital equipment, spare parts and raw materials needed for 
the production process, may buy domestically only the raw mate­
rials they use and may export only the finished product.77
The government, in 1967, had permitted imports using Bonus 
Expor credit with as little as 25% down payment at the time the 
letter of credit was opened.78 Later this policy was discon­
tinued, partly because of recurring abuses. A similar system 
was reintroduced when it was difficult to sell Bonus Expor from 
the U.S. because demand for the specific commodities which could 
be imported using U.S. credit was weak. On September 10, 1968, 
the Bank Negara Indonesia, Unit I, announced that for imports 
from the U.S. using credit Bonus Expor, the payment for the 
credit B.E. could be postponed.79 80 On November 5, 1968, the Bank 
announced that for credit B.E. imports from donor countries 
other than the U.S., 60% for "A" and 50% for "B" goods of the 
rupiah cost of the foreign exchange for opening up the letter 
of credit might be financed by the bank, and that importers 
might also obtain an extension of credit after the goods had 
arrived.8 0
Government Imports
Since Sumitro became Minister of Trade, the government has 
continued to rely on state trading companies to import essential 
commodities, because it desires to use enterprises which already 
have regular communications channels both inside and outside of
76. Sumitro, "Stabilization Policies," pp. 69-70; Sumitro Djojo- 
hadikusumo, Trade and Aid in Southeast Asia (Melbourne:
F. W. Cheshire, 1967), p. 110.
77. Business News, July 15, 1968, p. 6; Sinar Harapan, July 16, 
1968, p. 1.
78. Credit policy is officially formulated by the Central Bank, 
but certainly Sumitro plays an influential advisory role.
79. Sinar Harapan, September 21, 1968, p. 1; Business News, 
October 7, 1968, p. 13.
80. Sinar Harapan, November 5, 1968.
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the country and have been active in the field concerned for a 
long time.81 Sumitro evidently thinks that the state trading 
companies can usually meet these standards better than private 
enterprises since in the vast majority of the cases the consor­
tium leaders have been state trading companies,82 although in 
the case of PL-480 food imports most of the consortium members 
have been private firms.83
The Ministry of Trade under Sumitro has arranged for the 
importation of goods for two purposes: first, to increase the
regular supply of essential goods through the importation of 
PL-480 and other foreign aid financed commodities; and second, 
to import quickly an essential commodity if its price is rising, 
or expected to rise, in order to stabilize its price. This 
follows Sumitro1s "second line of defense" argument mentioned 
above. Foreign aid imports may also be timed to prevent pre­
dicted price increases. During the second half of 1968, PL-480 
financed imports of wheat flour, cotton yarn and raw cotton 
were carried out.84 Sumitro contracted for 35,000 metric tons 
of sugar to be imported to the outer islands and 25 million 
yards of coarse textiles to Indonesia as a whole, if possible 
before the end of 1968, to prevent rapid price increases which 
fiscal and monetary measures would be unable to counteract be­
fore the Christmas, Idulfitri, New Year and Chinese New Year 
holidays. In the case of salted fish, on the.other hand, he 
felt that the "first line of defense," fiscal and monetary 
policy, was enough to stabilize prices.85
In April 1969, when the price of sugar began to rise, 
Sumitro used his "second line of defense" again by temporarily 
prohibiting shipments of sugar from Central Java to other pro­
vinces; while this kept down prices in Central Java, he arranged 
to import sugar into the other regions of Indonesia, and suc­
ceeded in bringing the Djakarta sugar price down to Rp. 65 per 
kilogram in June from a high of Rp. 85 per kilogram in April, 
although the June price was still about 12% higher than the 
March 1969 price.86 As he had advocated before taking office, 
Sumitro still favors using fiscal and monetary policy and direct
1—
1 
oo Business News, December 13, 1968 , P* 22.
82 . Ibid., September 6, 1968, p. 
14A; September 13, 1968, p.
15A; 
3.
September 11, 1968, p
OOoo Indonesian Economic Bulletin , August 8, 1969.
00 Business News, September 6, 1968 , p- 15A; September 11,1968, p. 14A; September 13, 1968 , p- 3 .
85. 
86 .
Ibid., December 13, 1968, pp 
Ibid., July 7, 1969, p. 9.
. 20, 22 •
207
controls to assure that supplies of a product are available if 
needed to control inflationary pressures, but he has not so far 
used retail price controls, which are anyway difficult to en­
force in Indonesia.
Entrepot Zones
One of the most important factors hindering direct importa­
tion from Western Europe and from the United States, as opposed 
to using the entrepots of Hong Kong and Singapore, is the sig­
nificantly longer delivery time. Because of the very high 
domestic interest rates in Indonesia, a longer delivery time 
means a significantly higher real rupiah cost per dollar of 
C. S F. imported value.8' Therefore, even though the C. S F. 
dollar price of importing from Singapore or Hong Kong may be 
higher, the importer often prefers to import from these areas 
because his rupiah interest costs are less and he can get a 
faster turnover of his limited capital.
The Indonesian government has taken steps to increase im­
ports from producer countries rather than re-export areas, such 
as Hong Kong and Singapore, by establishing entrepot zones, first 
in Djakarta and later in Medan, Makassar and Tjilatjap.87 8 
Entrepot zones allow foreign exporters to promote their goods 
without permitting them to become importers themselves. Pro­
ducts eligible for B.E. credit financing and that have been 
certified by an international surveying company or the Indone­
sian government representative in the area from which they are 
exported may be sent into the entrepot zone duty free and stored 
there.89 In this manner, the financing expenses from the time 
of manufacturing until the time of arrival in Indonesia are 
borne by the foreign exporters or manufacturers, who can gener­
ally obtain financing at lower interest rates than Indonesian 
importers. The foreign exporter need no longer entrust his 
goods to someone else, as he did under the former B.E. without 
a cover system, although he must have confidence that the secur­
ity of his goods will be maintained and that government regula­
tions with respect to the zone will be enforced and not changed 
adversely without adequate notice. The matter of security in 
the entrepot zones under present conditions is indeed a crucial 
question. The frequent theft of articles in the regular harbor
87. The C. 8 F. price is the foreign exchange price of the good 
in the port of destination; it includes the f.o.b. price 
plus freight charges.
88. Kompas, November 6, 1968, p. 1.
89. Business News, December 2, 1968, pp. 15A-16A; Kompas, Novem­
ber 6, 1968, p. 1.
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area in Tandjung Priok and the general lack of security are cer­
tainly important factors making foreign exporters reluctant to 
use the entrepot zones except to send articles that have already 
been sold.90
President Suharto, on October 28, 1968, instructed the 
Ministers of Trade, Finance, and Communications, the Governor 
of the Central Bank and the Chief of Staff of Defense and Secur­
ity (HANKAM) to take immediate steps to open the entrepot zones 
project.91 By June 1969, the entrepot zone in Djakarta was in 
operation although several months later than originally planned. 
The volume of business will undoubtedly increase rapidly once 
it becomes clear that security can be maintained.
In addition, on August 28, 1968, the government stipulated 
that exporters in Singapore and Hong Kong cannot draw their 
letters of credit until after their goods have been inspected 
in Indonesia by a surveying company approved by the Indonesian 
government. This measure also tends to cause an increase in 
imports direct from the producing countries, although the main 
purpose of the regulation was probably to prevent large-scale 
B.E. manipulations, as had happened previously.
The government has rejected other methods which would in­
crease the proportion of imports coming direct from the produc­
ing countries, such as setting import quotas and using discrimi­
natory tariff and credit policy. Such measures, by encouraging 
imports from the producing nations even if their C. 8 F. prices 
were higher, would result in Indonesia paying more for its im­
ports rather than less. By using the entrepot zones, the govern­
ment expects to increase the competitiveness of the producing 
countries by making their selling terms more attractive, rather 
than by reducing those of the re-export areas.
Summary
Most of Sumitro*s policies since June 1968 have been con­
sistent with his earlier ideas. He still believes the govern­
ment must take a role in developing areas important from the 
social viewpoint but where there is insufficient private inter­
est. Although the government today devotes somewhat less atten­
tion to this than during the Sukarno period, its interest con­
tinues as shown in the active promotion of crumb rubber factories. 
The Ministry of Trade has not only taken measures to attract
90. Business News, November 8, 1968, p. 2; June 25, 1969, p. 6; 
July M-, 1969 , p . 5 .
91. Kompas, October 31, 1968, p. 1.
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private investment but has also imported the equipment for some 
crumb rubber factories itself. The government has endeavored 
to attract foreign investment in motor vehicle assembly and also 
made direct investment in this industry by appointing a govern­
ment enterprise as one of the assembling companies. Under the 
jurisdiction of other Ministries, government enterprises are 
investing government funds either on their own or in cooperation 
with foreign private firms. Sumitro has continued to support 
the state trading companies by giving them a large amount of 
Ministry of Trade business, though he has avoided giving them 
import and export monopolies, as had occurred during the Sukarno 
era.
The establishment of the Sole Agency for Copra Affairs and 
also the coffee syndicates, all supervised by the Ministry of 
Trade, demonstrate the government’s indirect participation in 
these sectors and one way in which it tries to guarantee justice 
in the distribution of products and assure that the producers 
receive a sufficient income. These agencies are examples of 
the type of institutional change, long advocated by Sumitro, 
which enable the government to restrict the trade channels 
through which products can flow. The Sole Agency for Copra 
Affairs, for example, has a monopoly on exports; it can also de­
termine which enterprises are permitted to buy from the pro­
ducers, how much copra will be exported and how much will be 
sent to copra deficit regions within Indonesia. Through the 
respective agency or syndicate, the Ministry of Trade can set 
the price paid to the producers, but Sumitro has not attempted 
to control retail prices directly nor has he rationed any pro­
ducts to consumers or producers. The agency involved can, how­
ever, control the supply of sugar, coffee and copra to the main 
consuming areas. In theory, if syndicates and agencies holding 
monopolies on the distribution of products operate effectively, 
they can contribute to economic development. But when an agency 
controls such things as membership, sub-contracts to distribute 
products, prices, etc., an opportunity for corruption is created. 
Frequently in Indonesia, when such an agency has existed, indi­
viduals and political interests have tried to gain control of 
the agency for their own profit, thereby preventing it from 
achieving its original objectives. In such a case it would have 
been better if the agency had not been set up at all. The future 
success of the syndicates and the Sole Agency for Copra Affairs 
will depend on their being free from corruption and the control 
of vested interests.
In power, Sumitro has acted consistently with his earlier 
writings, and supports the present government’s policy of using 
the import sector as a source of revenue for the government.
He has favored increased use of foreign exchange to import needed 
raw materials and other inputs, spare parts and capital equip­
ment, a policy incorporated in the Five Year Plan, and in general 
to ensure that foreign exchange resources are channeled into 
uses which contribute to development. The use of foreign
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exchange has principally been determined by the forces of supply 
and demand, but the government affects these forces through vari­
ous policy measures, such as setting import duties, import credit 
policy, determining which goods are on the B.E. list, and the ban­
ning of imports of certain goods; in addition, about 20% of 
total imports are carried out by the government itself.
SumitroTs foreign trade policy during the past fourteen 
months has been very similar to his proposals of the 1950fs.
His export policy has been aimed principally at increasing for­
eign exchange earnings in order to finance the importation of 
goods required for economic development. He has acknowledged 
the importance of international trade in the development pro­
cess, in sharp contrast with the bevdikavi or "stand-on-your- 
own-feet" policy of the later Sukarno years. He has favored 
more government control over imports and exports than his pre­
decessor did, but less than that in operation at the end of the 
Sukarno era. During his first fourteen months in office, he 
has also made significant institutional changes to secure effec­
tive implementation of his overall policies.
In the early 1950’s, Sumitro wrote that, with economic 
development, export earnings of the underdeveloped countries 
would depend less and less on primary commodities. So far, 
however, he has done little to promote exports of cottage in­
dustry and other industrial goods. In‘the short term, the dif­
ficulties of exporting industrial products are much greater than 
exporting primary' commodities because it is more difficult to 
attract foreign investment in this sector. There is a serious 
shortage of domestic industrial skills and capital, and it is 
more difficult to expand markets abroad.
There has been a drive to increase exports of Indonesia^ 
traditional products--copra, coffee, tobacco and rubber-repre­
senting not only a short-term rehabilitation program, but also 
including long-term investments in replanting trees and the 
construction of processing factories. Evidently, Sumitro ex­
pects exports of these products to be important foreign exchange 
earners for many years to come. During the next five years, the 
emphasis will shift to broadening the export base by increasing 
exports of Group B relative to Group A primary commodities, 
rather than increasing exports of non-primary commodities. In 
his import policies, however, Sumitro has stressed the rehabili­
tation of the industrial sector and still expects that industrial 
products will become an important component of Indonesian exports 
in the future.
Sumitro wrote that one of the weaknesses of the classical 
comparative cost theory of international trade is the strong 
element of monopoly on the side of the industrialized countries 
which works to the detriment of the underdeveloped countries.
By continuing to prevent foreign companies from importing and 
exporting except under certain conditions, by restricting greatly
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the areas in internal trade where they can operate, and by re­
quiring that foreign investment projects in trade must be joint 
ventures with Indonesian nationals, Sumitro is trying to limit 
the power of foreign enterprises to control Indonesia!s economic 
life. At the same time, he is working to improve Indonesia’s 
own bargaining position in world markets through the formation 
of the commodity syndicates and the Sole Agency for Copra 
Affairs.
Sumitro still favors strict government control over foreign 
exchange. When the head of the Indonesian Exporters’ Associa­
tion (Gabungan Pengusaha Exporter Indonesia) requested, in 
December 1968, that exporters receive 100% of the value of their 
exports in foreign exchange, Sumitro rejected this proposal be­
cause he feared it would allow outside forces to affect the 
utilization of foreign exchange in a way harmful to the general 
welfare.92 As in his earlier writings, Sumitro continues to 
support having either one or two exchange rates.
Sumitro’s policies have continued to be aimed at protecting 
’’infant” industries, without favoring the development of ’’sub­
marginal” industries, or placing quantitative restrictions on 
the importation of goods for which domestic industries can sup­
ply local demand. Although the Indonesian industrial sector 
must be protected,he insists that the interests of the consumers 
must also be taken into consideration, particularly where essen­
tial goods are concerned. He demonstrated this in the fall of 
1968, when he imported textiles despite opposition from textile 
producers.
92. Business News, December 13, 1968, p. 1.
